Information, egalitarianism and the value by Routledge, RR
Operations Research Letters 44 (2016) 775–778Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Operations Research Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/orl
Information, egalitarianism and the value
R.R. Routledge
The University of Liverpool, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 29 March 2016
Received in revised form
21 September 2016
Accepted 21 September 2016
Available online 3 October 2016
Keywords:
Missing information
Cooperative games
Egalitarianism
Nullifying players
a b s t r a c t
This work proposes a value for a cooperative game with missing information. The value distributes the
worth of the grand coalition on the basis of the number of known coalitions. When all the information is
contained in the characteristic function the value coincides with the equal division solution. An axiomatic
characterization of the value is presented which uses the nullifying player axiom introduced in van den
Brink (2007).
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Despite it being over sixty years since it was first published,
the most important single-valued solution for a cooperative game
remains the Shapley value proposed in [11]. One important rea-
son to explain this is that the Shapley value uses all the infor-
mation contained in the characteristic function to determine each
player’s payoff. Also, the Shapley value admits a simple and con-
vincing axiomatic characterization. Shapley himself expressed sur-
prise at the characterization noting that ‘‘It is remarkable that no
further conditions are required to determine the value uniquely’’.
Another reason for the prominence of the Shapley value is the deep
connections, explained in [1], between the Shapley value and the
competitive equilibrium in smooth economies with an atomless
continuum of individuals. However, because all the information
about theworths of the coalitions is required to calculate the Shap-
ley value, this is also a drawback of the solution. If the character-
istic function represents a one-off interaction between the players
it may be that there is no way of knowing the worths of particu-
lar coalitions. An alternative, which is easier to model using stan-
dard tools, is to consider the case where the characteristic function
is uncertain. Many papers have suggested solutions to uncertain
cooperative games, including [3,4,9,12]. Suppose, then, some in-
formation is missing from the characteristic function. How should
an impartial observer distribute the worth of the grand coalition
amongst the players? It is this question which this work tries to
answer.
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from the power set of the players into the union of the real line
and the empty set. If, for some coalition, their worth is equal to
the empty set, then the worth of the coalition is treated as being
missing from the game. Therefore, the model permits arbitrary
information to be missing from the characteristic function. The
only assumptions imposed upon the characteristic function are
that the worth of the grand coalition is not equal to the empty set,
and the worth of the empty set is zero. Ideally, one would like a
value for a game to possess three key properties:
1. Be applicable to the whole domain under consideration.
2. Be easy to calculate—at least in games with small numbers of
players.
3. It should have a clear axiomatic characterization which reveals
the underlying behaviour of the value.
The solution advanced here satisfies these three properties. The
value distributes the worth of the grand coalition between the
players in proportion to the number of known coalitions of which
each player is a member. It is such that when all the information
is contained in the characteristic function it coincides with the
equal division solution. Therefore, the value can be thought of as
an extension of the equal division solution to a wider domain than
is normally studied in the literature. An axiomatic characterization
of the value is presented using four axioms: efficiency, additivity,
nullifying player and known coalitions. Efficiency requires that the
value always distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst
the players. The axiom of additivity states, in the usual way, that if
the value is applied to the sum of games, then the payoff should
be equal to the sum of the payoffs when the value is applied
to the separate games. The axiom of nullifying player was used
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and egalitarian solutions. A player is a nullifying player if all the
known coalitions which contain the player have a worth of zero.
The axiom states that nullifying players receive zero payoff. Finally,
the axiom of known information applies to non-nullifying players
and requires that the payoffs be related to the number of known
coalitions in the game. The reasoning behind the known coalitions
axiom is that, if there is positive worth distributed amongst non-
nullifying players, then themore known coalitions a player belongs
to, the higher should be their payoff. When all the information
is contained in the characteristic function, the axiom of known
coalitions implies symmetric payoffs to non-nullifying players.
1.1. Related literature
The interest in axiomatic value theory began with [11]
demonstrating that the axioms of efficiency, symmetry, additivity
and carrier player characterize a unique solution on the space
of cooperative games. Since that paper there has been sustained
interest in axiomatic value theory. This brief survey only covers
the most important, and recent contributions, to the literature.
A succinct and detailed textbook treatment of value theory is
contained in [7], especially chapters 18 and 20. In [10] the main
alternative to the Shapley value was proposed, which is the
nucleolus. The nucleolus lexicographically minimizes the ordered
vector of excesses, and unlike the Shapley value, always selects
from the core of a game whenever it is non-empty. Even if the
core is empty, the nucleolus is often interpreted as the core-centre
of a game. In a series of papers, [14,15] it was demonstrated
that the mathematically convenient axiom of additivity could be
dropped in the characterization of the Shapley value and replaced
with the economically intuitive axiom of strong monotonicity (or
marginalism).
In recent years, there has been particular interest in values
which are more egalitarian than the Shapley value, or can be
applied towider domains. In [8] a solidarity value for a cooperative
gamewas suggested. In this value, each player receives the average
of the marginal contributions of the players preceding them in
each permutation. By replacing the usual null player axiom with
an average null player axiom, and finding a basis for a game which
differed from the usual unanimity game basis, they were able
to characterize the solidarity value. In [13] it was demonstrated
that if the null player axiom is replaced with a nullifying player
axiom in the usual Shapley characterization, then the axioms
characterize the equal division solution (in which the worth
of the grand coalition is divided equally between the players).
Several other egalitarian solutions were also analysed, such as
the centre of the imputation set, and an application to auction
theorywas presented. Thework in [6] studied procedural values in
which each player could receive particular shares of the marginal
contributions of players preceding them in each permutation of
the players. These procedural values include the Shapley value, the
solidarity value and the equal division solution as special cases.
In [5] the same model as in this paper was analysed, in which
arbitrary information may be missing from a cooperative game,
and considered three different ways in which the Shapley value
may be extended to the missing information domain. In [2] a
production economy was studied, and the axioms of efficiency,
symmetry and monotonicity were shown to characterize overall
proportional taxation rates.
2. The model
Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be the finite set of players in the
game. A cooperative game with missing information is (N, v)
with v being the characteristic function v : 2N → ℜ ∪ {∅}.A coalition is an S ⊆ N . The grand coalition is N . For any coalition
S ⊆ N , if v(S) ≠ ∅, then v(S) is the money worth which S can
obtain independently of the other players. If v(S) = ∅, then the
worth of coalition S is missing from the game.
Assumption 2.1. For every v : 2N → ℜ ∪ {∅}, v(N) ≠ ∅ and
v(∅) = 0.
Let G denote the space of games satisfying Assumption 2.1. A value
is a function ϕ : G → ℜN . For each v ∈ G a value assigns a unique
payoff vector inℜN . For any v ∈ G let the set K(v) be
K(v) = {S ⊆ N : v(S) ≠ ∅}.
The set K(v) is the set of known coalitions in the game v. Two
games v,w ∈ G will be called comparable if K(v) = K(w). Let
Ki(v) be the set
Ki(v) = {S ∈ K(v) : i ∈ S}.
The set Ki(v) contains those coalitions of which player i is a
member and whose worths are known in the game v. Note that
Assumption 2.1 ensures that for every v ∈ G, |Ki(v)| ≥ 1. The
following example should help to make these ideas clear.
2.1. An illustrative example
Suppose the set of players is N = {1, 2, 3}. The worth of the
grand coalition is v(N) = 8. The worths of the smaller coalitions
are
v(12) = v(13) = 8, v(1) = 8, v(∅) = 0
and
v(S) = ∅ for all other coalitions.
How should the money worth of the grand coalition, 8, be dis-
tributed amongst the players? The payoff vector which this work
proposes to the distribution problem is (x1, x2, x3) = (4, 2, 2). This
distribution seems fair because there are more coalitions which
contain player 1whoseworths are known. Also, there are the same
number of known coalitions containing players 2 and 3, so it seems
reasonable to give players 2 and 3 the same payoff.
2.2. The value and axioms
Here four axioms are defined: efficiency, additivity, nullifying
player and known coalitions. The first is efficiency, which requires
that the value always distributes all of the worth of the grand
coalition amongst the players.
Definition 2.1. A value ϕ satisfies efficiency if

i∈N ϕi(N, v) =
v(N) for every v ∈ G.
The axiom of additivity links the payoffs which players receive
across the addition of different games. Before defining the axiom
of additivity, let us define the sum of games on the missing
information domain.
Definition 2.2. Suppose v,w ∈ G. If the games v and w are
comparable, so K(v) = K(w), the game u = v + w is given by
u(S) =

v(S)+ w(S) if S ∈ K(v);
∅ if S ∉ K(v).
Addition of two games is only defined when the games have the
same set of known coalitions.
Definition 2.3. A value ϕ satisfies additivity if, whenever v,w ∈ G
are comparable,ϕi(N, v+w) = ϕi(N, v)+ϕi(N, w) for every i ∈ N .
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v(S) = 0 for every S ∈ Ki(v). If a player is a nullifying player then
all of the known coalitions which contain the player have a worth
of zero. This is an intuitive extension of the nullifying player axiom
used in [13] to the missing information domain. For any v ∈ G let
N (v) denote the set of nullifying players in game v.
Definition 2.4. A value ϕ satisfies nullifying player if, whenever
i ∈ N (v), then ϕi(N, v) = 0.
Finally, the axiom of known coalitions requires that the payoffs of
players, who are not nullifying players, be related to the number of
known coalitions of which they are members.
Definition 2.5. A value ϕ satisfies known coalitions if, whenever
i, j ∈ N \N (v), then
|Kj(v)|ϕi(N, v) = |Ki(v)|ϕj(N, v).
The intuition behind the known coalitions axiom is that the payoff
of a player,who is not nullifying player, should increasewhen there
is positive worth to distribute and, other things equal, the number
of known coalitions containing the player increases. In essence, the
axiom is a strengthening of the usual axiom of symmetry. Two
players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in game v ∈ G if v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S ∪ {j}) for every S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. If two non-nullifying players are
symmetric in game v then the axiom of known coalitions ensures
that they receive the same payoff. However, the axiom also relates
the payoffs of players who may not be symmetric in a game. The
value which this work suggests is:
ϕ∗i (N, v) =
|Ki(v)|
j∈N
|Kj(v)|v(N) for every i ∈ N. (1)
This value is defined for any game in G and distributes the worth
of the grand coalition in such a way that each player receives
worth in proportion to the number of known coalitions of which
they are a member. If the game v ∈ G is such that K(v) = 2N
then ϕ∗i (N, v) = v(N)/n for every i ∈ N . Therefore the value
coincideswith the equal division solutionwhen all the information
is contained in the characteristic function. This is why the value
proposed here is egalitarian: it takes into consideration the amount
of information contained in the characteristic function, but not
what the information reveals about players’ claims upon theworth
of the grand coalition. The next result demonstrates that this value
satisfies the four axioms.
Proposition 2.1. The value ϕ∗ satisfies efficiency, additivity, nullify-
ing player and known information.
Proof. It is evident from the definition of ϕ∗ that it satisfies
efficiency and additivity. To see that ϕ∗ satisfies nullifying player,
suppose i ∈ N (v). Then v(N) = 0 and
ϕ∗i (N, v) =
|Ki(v)| · 0
j∈N
|Kj(v)| = 0.
Finally, to see that ϕ∗ satisfies known information, suppose i, j ∈
N \N (v). Then
|Kj(v)|ϕ∗i (N, v) =
|Kj(v)||Ki(v)|v(N)
l∈N
|Kl(v)| = |Ki(v)|ϕ
∗
j (N, v). 
For any v ∈ G, and T ∈ K(v)with T ≠ ∅, consider the following
special games:
wT ,K(v)(S) =
1 if S = T , S ∈ K(v);
0 if S ≠ T , S ∈ K(v);
∅ if S ∉ K(v).For any α ∈ ℜ the game αwT ,K(v) is given by:
αwT ,K(v)(S) =

α if S = T , S ∈ K(v);
0 if S ≠ T , S ∈ K(v);
∅ if S ∉ K(v).
Thinking of a game v as a vector inℜK(v)\{∅}, the next result states
that the special games above are a basis of the spaceℜK(v)\{∅}.
Proposition 2.2. For each v ∈ G there exist unique real numbers
{αT : T ∈ K(v) \ {∅}} such that
v(S) =

T∈K(v)\{∅}
αTwT ,K(v)(S) for every S ∈ K(v).
Proof. The result follows from noting that the games wT ,K(v) are
the standard canonical basis onℜK(v)\{∅}. 
Using this result, the final proposition shows that ϕ∗ is the only
value to satisfy the four axioms on the space G.
Proposition 2.3. The unique value satisfying efficiency, additivity,
nullifying player and known coalitions on G is ϕ∗.
Proof. As ϕ∗ satisfies the four axioms, all that needs to be demon-
strated is that the four axioms uniquely determine the payoff vec-
tor in any game.
Let ϕ be a value satisfying the four axioms. Fix a v ∈ G. From
Proposition 2.2, and as ϕ satisfies additivity,
ϕ(N, v) =

T∈K(v)\{∅}
ϕ(N, αTwT ,K(v)).
If αT = 0 then every player in αTwT ,K(v) is a nullifying player and
ϕi(N, αTwT ,K(v)) = 0 for every i ∈ N .
If αT ≠ 0 and i ∈ N \ T then i is a nullifying player in the game
αTwT ,K(v). Therefore
ϕi(N, αTwT ,K(v)) = 0 for every i ∈ N \ T .
The axiom of known coalitions requires, for every i, j ∈ T , that
|Kj(αTwT ,K(v))|ϕi(N, αTwT ,K(v))
= |Ki(αTwT ,K(v))|ϕj(N, αTwT ,K(v)).
As |Kj(αTwT ,K(v))| = |Kj(v)| and |Ki(αTwT ,K(v))| = |Ki(v)|we have
|Kj(v)|ϕi(N, αTwT ,K(v)) = |Ki(v)|ϕj(N, αTwT ,K(v)).
Fixing i and summing over all j ∈ T yields
j∈T
|Kj(v)|

ϕi(N, αTwT ,K(v))
= |Ki(v)|

j∈T
ϕj(N, αTwT ,K(v))

.
As ϕ satisfies efficiency,

j∈T ϕj(N, αTwT ,K(v)) = αTwT ,K(v)(N).
Hence
j∈T
|Kj(v)|

ϕi(N, αTwT ,K(v)) = |Ki(v)|αTwT ,K(v)(N)
and
ϕi(N, αTwT ,K(v)) = |Ki(v)|
j∈T
|Kj(v)|αTwT ,K(v)(N)
for every i ∈ T .
Therefore the four axioms uniquely determine the payoff vector in
each game. 
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This work has suggested a value for a cooperative game with
missing information. The valueϕ∗ has the attractive properties that
it can be applied to any game, is easy to calculate and has intuitive
axiomatic characterization. However, there are two weaknesses
which it would be desirable to remedy. First, in a cooperative game
with missing information one would like to reward the players
for two things: (i) the amount of information there is about the
players (the number of coalitions there are containing the players)
(ii) the actual worths of coalitions and what they reveal about the
marginal contributions of the players. Clearly, ϕ∗ only rewards the
players for (i) and does not take (ii) into consideration. When all
the information is contained in the characteristic function (i) does
not have to taken into consideration and one can reward players
solely on the basis of (ii). This is precisely what the Shapley value
does. But, it would be desirable to find a value which is versatile
enough to reward players on the basis of both (i) and (ii). Such
a value would inevitably be more complicated than ϕ∗, and as a
result, it may not be easy to provide an axiomatic characterization.
Second, the value ϕ∗ does not satisfy linear covariance of games.
This is a general weakness of egalitarian solutions and was noted
by [13]. Itwould beuseful to find values for cooperative gameswith
missing informationwhich satisfy linear covariance and can also be
characterized axiomatically, such as an analogue of the centre of
the imputation set. How this set should be extended to the model
of a cooperative game with missing information is an interesting
open question.
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